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Abstract
Popular approaches to differential privacy, such
as the Laplace and exponential mechanisms, cal-
ibrate randomised smoothing through global sen-
sitivity of the target non-private function. Bound-
ing such sensitivity is often a prohibitively com-
plex analytic calculation. As an alternative, we
propose a straightforward sampler for estimat-
ing sensitivity of non-private mechanisms. Since
our sensitivity estimates hold with high prob-
ability, any mechanism that would be (, δ)-
differentially private under bounded global sen-
sitivity automatically achieves (, δ, γ)-random
differential privacy (Hall et al., 2012), without
any target-specific calculations required. We
demonstrate on worked example learners how
our usable approach adopts a naturally-relaxed
privacy guarantee, while achieving more accu-
rate releases even for non-private functions that
are black-box computer programs.
1. Introduction
Differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006) has emerged as
the dominant framework for protected privacy of sensitive
training data when releasing learned models to untrusted
third parties. This paradigm owes its popularity in part
to the strong privacy model provided, and in part to the
availability of general building block mechanisms such as
the Laplace (Dwork et al., 2006) & exponential (McSherry
& Talwar, 2007), and to composition lemmas for building
up more complex mechanisms. These generic mechanisms
come endowed with privacy and utility bounds that hold
for any appropriate application. Such tools almost alle-
viate the burden of performing theoretical analysis in de-
veloping privacy-preserving learners. However a persis-
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tent requirement is the need to bound global sensitivity—a
Lipschitz constant of the target, non-private function. For
simple scalar statistics of the private database, sensitivity
can be easily bounded (Dwork et al., 2006). However in
many applications—from collaborative filtering (McSherry
& Mironov, 2009) to Bayesian inference (Dimitrakakis
et al., 2014; 2017; Wang et al., 2015)—the principal chal-
lenge in privatisation is completing this calculation.
In this work we develop a simple approach to approxi-
mating global sensitivity with high probability, assuming
only oracle access to target function evaluations. Com-
bined with generic mechanisms like Laplace, exponential,
Gaussian or Bernstein, our sampler enables systematising
of privatisation: arbitrary computer programs can be made
differentially private with no additional mathematical anal-
ysis nor dynamic/static analysis, whatsoever. Our approach
does not make any assumptions about the function under
evaluation or underlying sampling distribution.
Contributions. This paper contributes: i) SENSITIVI-
TYSAMPLER for easily-implemented empirical estimation
of global sensitivity of (potentially black-box) non-private
mechanisms; ii) Empirical process theory for guaranteeing
random differential privacy for any mechanism that pre-
serves (stronger) differential privacy under bounded global
sensitivity; iii) Experiments demonstrating our sampler on
learners for which analytical sensitivity bounds are highly
involved; and iv) Examples where sensitivity estimates beat
(pessimistic) bounds, delivering pain-free random differen-
tial privacy at higher levels of accuracy, when used in con-
cert with generic privacy-preserving mechanisms.
Related Work. This paper builds on the large body of
work in differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006; Dwork
& Roth, 2014), which has gained broad interest in part
due the framework’s strong guarantees of data privacy
when releasing aggregate statistics or models, and due to
availability of many generic privatising mechanisms e.g.,:
Laplace (Dwork et al., 2006), exponential (McSherry &
Talwar, 2007), Gaussian (Dwork & Roth, 2014), Bern-
stein (Alda` & Rubinstein, 2017) and many more. While
these mechanisms present a path to privatisation without
need for reproving differential privacy or utility, they do
have in common a need to analytically bound sensitivity—
a Lipschitz-type condition on the target non-private func-
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tion. Often derivations are intricate e.g., for collabora-
tive filtering (McSherry & Mironov, 2009), SVMs (Ru-
binstein et al., 2012; Chaudhuri et al., 2011), model se-
lection (Thakurta & Smith, 2013), feature selection (Kifer
et al., 2012), Bayesian inference (Dimitrakakis et al., 2014;
2017; Wang et al., 2015), SGD in deep learning (Abadi
et al., 2016), etc. Undoubtedly the non-trivial nature of
bounding sensitivity prohibits adoption by some domain
experts. We address this challenge through the SENSITIVI-
TYSAMPLER that estimates sensitivity empirically—even
for privatising black-box computer programs—providing
high probability privacy guarantees generically.
Several systems have been developed to ease deployment
of differentially privacy, with Barthe et al. (2016) overview-
ing contributions from Programming Languages. Dynamic
approaches track privacy budget expended at runtime, typ-
ically through basic operations on data with known privacy
loss, e.g., the PINQ (McSherry, 2009; McSherry & Ma-
hajan, 2010) and Airavat (Roy et al., 2010) systems. These
create a C# LINQ-like interface and a framework for bring-
ing differential privacy to MapReduce, respectively. While
such approaches are flexible, the lack of static checking
means privacy violations are not caught until after (lengthy)
computations. Static checking approaches provide fore-
warning of privacy usage. In this mould, Fuzz (Reed &
Pierce, 2010; Palamidessi & Stronati, 2012) offers a higher-
order functional language whose static type system tracks
sensitivity based on linear logic, so that sensitivity (and
therefore differential privacy) is guaranteed by typecheck-
ing. Limited to a similar level of program expressive-
ness as PINQ, Fuzz cannot typecheck many desirable tar-
get programs and specifically cannot track data-dependent
function sensitivity, with the DFuzz system demonstrat-
ing preliminary work towards this challenge (Gaboardi
et al., 2013). While promoting privacy-by-design, such
approaches impose specialised languages or limit target
feasibility—challenges addressed by this work. More-
over our SENSITIVITYSAMPLER mechanism complements
such systems, e.g., within broader frameworks for protect-
ing against side-channel attacks (Haeberlen et al., 2011;
Mohan et al., 2012).
Minami et al. (2016) show that special-case Gibbs sam-
pler is (, δ)-DP without bounded sensitivity. Nissim et al.
(2007) ask: Why calibrate for worst-case global sensitiv-
ity when the actual database does not witness worst-case
neighbours? Their smoothed sensitivity approach priva-
tises local sensitivity, which itself is sensitive to perturba-
tion. While this can lead to better sensitivity estimates, our
sampled sensitivity still does not require analytical bounds.
A related approach is the sample-and-aggregate mecha-
nism (Nissim et al., 2007) which avoids computation of
sensitivity of the underlying target function and instead re-
quires sensitivity of an aggregator combining the outputs of
the non-private target run repeatedly on subsamples of the
data. By contrast, our approach provides direct sensitivity
estimates, permitting direct privatisation.
Our application of empirical process theory to estimate
hard-to-compute quantities resembles the work of Riondato
& Upfal (2015). They use VC-theory and sampling to ap-
proximate mining frequent itemsets. Here we approximate
analytical computations, and to our knowledge provide a
first generic mechanism that preserves random differen-
tial privacy (Hall et al., 2012)—a natural weakening of the
strong guarantee of differential privacy. Hall et al. (2012)
leverage empirical process theory for a specific worked ex-
ample, while our setting is general sensitivity estimation.
2. Background
We are interested in non-private mechanism f : Dn →
B that maps databases in product space over domain D
to responses in a normed space B. The terminology
of “database” (DB) comes from statistical databases, and
should be understood as a dataset.
Example 1. For instance, in supervised learning of linear
classifiers, the domain could be Euclidean vectors compris-
ing features & labels, and responses might be parameteri-
sations of learned classifiers such as a normal vector.
We aim to estimate sensitivity which is commonly used to
calibrate noise in differentially-private mechanisms.
Definition 2. The global sensitivity of non-private f :
Dn → B is given by ∆ = supD,D′ ‖f(D)− f(D′)‖B,
where the supremum is taken over all pairs of neighbour-
ing databases D,D′ in Dn that differ in one point.
Definition 3. Randomized mechanism M : Dn → R
responding with values in arbitrary response set R pre-
serves -differential privacy for  > 0 if for all neigh-
bouring D,D′ ∈ Dn and measurable R ⊂ R it holds
that Pr (M(D) ∈ R) ≤ exp()Pr (M(D′) ∈ R). If in-
stead for 0 < δ < 1 it holds that Pr (M(D) ∈ R) ≤
exp()Pr (M(D′) ∈ R) + δ then the mechanism preserves
the weaker notion of (, δ)-differential privacy.
In Section 4, we recall a number of key mechanisms that
preserve these notions of privacy by virtue of target non-
private function sensitivity.
The following definition due to Hall et al. (2012) relaxes
the requirement that uniform smoothness of response dis-
tribution holds on all pairs of databases, to the requirement
that uniform smoothness holds for likely database pairs.
Definition 4. Randomized mechanism M : Dn → R
responding with values in an arbitrary response set R
preserves (, γ)-random differential privacy, at
privacy level  > 0 and confidence γ ∈ (0, 1), if
Pr (∀R ⊂ R,Pr (M(D) ∈ R) ≤ ePr (M(D′) ∈ R)) ≥
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1 − γ, with the inner probabilities over the mechanism’s
randomization, and the outer probability over neighbour-
ing D,D′ ∈ Dn drawn from some Pn+1. The weaker
(, δ)-DP has analogous definition as (, δ, γ)-RDP.
Remark 5. While strong -DP is ideal, utility may demand
compromise. Precedent exists for weaker privacy, with the
definition of (, δ)-DP wherein on any databases (including
likely ones) a private mechanism may leak sensitive infor-
mation on low probability responses, forgiven by the addi-
tive δ relaxation. (, γ)-RDP offers an alternate relaxation,
where on all but a small γ-proportion of unlikely database
pairs, strong -DP holds—RDP plays a useful role.
Example 6. Consider a database on unbounded posi-
tive reals D ∈ Rn+ representing loan default times of
a bank’s customers, and target release statistic f(D) =
n−1
∑n
i=1Di the sample mean. To -DP privatise scalar-
valued f(D) it is natural to look to the Laplace mechanism.
However the mechanism requires a bound on the statistic’s
global sensitivity, impossible under unbounded D. Note
for ∆ > 0, when neighbouring D,D′ satisfy {|f(D) −
f(D′)| ≤ ∆} then Laplace mechanism M∆,(f(D)) en-
joys -DP on that DB pair. Therefore the probability of
the latter event is bounded below by the probability of the
former. Modelling the default times by iid exponential vari-
ables of rate λ > 0, then |f(D)− f(D′)| = |Dn −D′n|/n
is distributed as Exp(nλ), and so
Pr (∀t ∈ R,Pr (M∆,(D) = t) ≤ ePr (M∆,(D′) = t))
≥Pr (|f(D)− f(D′)| ≤ ∆) = 1− e−λn∆ ≥ 1− γ ,
provided that ∆ ≥ log(1/γ)/(λn). While -DP fails due
to unboundedness, the data is likely bounded and so the
mechanism is likely strongly private: M∆, is (, γ)-RDP.
3. Problem Statement
We consider a statistician looking to apply a differentially-
private mechanism to an f : Dn → B whose sensitivity
cannot easily be bounded analytically (cf. Example 6 or
the case of a computer program).
Instead we assume that the statistician has the ability to
sample from some arbitrary product space Pn+1 on Dn+1,
can evaluate f arbitrarily (and in particular on the result
of this sampling), and is interested in applying a privatis-
ing mechanism with the guarantee of random differential
privacy (Definition 4).
Remark 7. Natural choices for P present themselves for
sampling or defining random differential privacy. P could
be taken as the underlying distribution from which a sensi-
tive DB was drawn—in the case of sensitive training data
but insensitive data source; an alternate test distribution
of interest in the case of domain adaptation; or P could
be uniform or an otherwise non-informative likelihood (cf.
Example 6). Proved in Appendix A, the following relates
RDP of similar distributions.
Proposition 8. Let P,Q be distributions on D with
bounded KL divergence KL(P‖Q) ≤ τ . If mechanism
M on databases in Dn is RDP with confidence γ > 0 wrt
P then it is also RDP with confidence γ +
√
(n+ 1)τ/2
wrt Q, with the same privacy parameters  (or , δ).
4. Sensitivity-Induced Differential Privacy
When a privatising mechanism M is known to achieve
differential privacy for some mapping f : Dn → B
under bounded global sensitivity, then our approach’s
high-probability estimates of sensitivity will imply high-
probability preservation of differential privacy. In order to
reason about such arguments, we introduce the concept of
sensitivity-induced differential privacy.
Definition 9. For arbitrary mapping f : Dn → B and
randomised mechanism M∆ : B → R, we say that M∆
is sensitivity-induced -differentially private if for a neigh-
bouring pair of databases D,D′ ∈ Dn, and ∆ ≥ 0
‖f(D)− f(D′)‖B ≤ ∆
=⇒ ∀R ⊂ R, Pr (M∆(f(D)) ∈ R)
≤ exp() · Pr (M∆(f(D′)) ∈ R)
with the qualification on R being all measurable subsets
of the response set R. In the same vein, the analogous
definition for (, δ)-differential privacy can also be made.
Many generic mechanisms in use today preserve differen-
tial privacy by virtue of satisfying this condition. The fol-
lowing are immediate consequences of existing proofs of
differential privacy. First, when a non-private target func-
tion f aims to release Euclidean vectors responses.
Corollary 10 (Laplace mechanism). Consider database
D ∈ Dn, normed space B = (Rd, ‖ · ‖1) for d ∈ N, non-
private function f : Dn → B. The Laplace mechanism1
(Dwork et al., 2006) M∆(f(D)) ∼ Lap (f(D),∆/), is
sensitivity-induced -differentially private.
Example 11. Example 6 used Corollary 10 for RDP of the
Laplace mechanism on unbounded bank loan defaults.
Corollary 12 (Gaussian mechanism). Consider database
D ∈ Dn, normed space B = (Rd, ‖ · ‖2) for some
d ∈ N, and non-private function f : Dn → B. The Gaus-
sian mechanism (Dwork & Roth, 2014) M∆(f(D)) ∼
N (f(D),diag (σ)) with σ2 > 2∆2 log(1.25/δ)/2, is
sensitivity-induced (, δ)-differentially private.
Second, f may aim to release elements of an arbitrary set
R, where a score function s(D, ·) benchmarks quality of
potential releases (placing a partial ordering onR).
1Lap (a, b) has unnormalised PDF exp(−‖x− a‖1/b).
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Algorithm 1 SENSITIVITYSAMPLER
Input: database size n, target mapping f : Dn → B,
sample size m, order statistic index k, distribution P
for i = 1 to m do
Sample D ∼ Pn+1
Set Gi = ‖f (D1...n)− f (D1...n−1,n+1)‖B
end for
Sort G1, . . . , Gm as G(1) ≤ . . . ≤ G(m)
return ∆ˆ = G(k)
Corollary 13 (Exponential mechanism). Consider
database D ∈ Dn, response space R, normed
space B = (RR, ‖ · ‖∞), non-private score function
s : Dn × R → R, and restriction f : Dn → B given by
f(D) = s(D, ·). The exponential mechanism (McSherry
& Talwar, 2007) M∆(f(D)) ∼ exp ( (f(D)) (r)/2∆),
which when normalised specifies a PDF over responses
r ∈ R, is sensitivity-induced -differentially private.
Third, f could be function-valued as for learning settings,
where given a training set we wish to release a model (e.g.,
classifier or predictive posterior) that can be subsequently
evaluated on (non-sensitive) test points.
Corollary 14 (Bernstein mechanism). Consider database
D ∈ Dn, query space Y = [0, 1]` with constant dimen-
sion ` ∈ N, lattice cover of Y of size k ∈ N given by
L = ({0, 1/k, . . . , 1})`, normed space B = (RY , ‖ · ‖∞),
non-private function F : Dn × Y → R, and restriction
f : Dn → B given by f(D) = F (D, ·). The Bern-
stein mechanism (Alda` & Rubinstein, 2017)M∆(f(D)) ∼{
Lap
(
(f(D))(p),∆(k + 1)`/
) | p ∈ L}, is sensitivity-
induced -differentially private.
Our framework does not apply directly to the objective per-
turbation mechanism of Chaudhuri et al. (2011), as that
mechanism does not rely directly on a notion of sensitiv-
ity of objective function, classifier, or otherwise. However
it can apply to the posterior sampler used for differentially-
private Bayesian inference (Mir, 2012; Dimitrakakis et al.,
2014; 2017; Zhang et al., 2016): there the target function
f : Dn → B returns the likelihood function p(D|·), itself
mapping parameters Θ to R; using the result of f(D) and
public prior ξ(θ), the mechanism samples from the poste-
rior ξ(B|D) = ∫
B
p(D|θ)dξ(θ)/ ∫
Θ
p(D|θ)dξ(θ); differ-
ential privacy follows from a Lipschitz condition on f that
would require our sensitivity sampler to sample from all
database pairs—a minor modification left for future work.
5. The Sensitivity Sampler
Algorithm 1 presents the SENSITIVITYSAMPLER in de-
tail. Consider privacy-insensitive independent sample
D1, . . . , Dm ∼ Pn+1 of databases on n+1 records, where
Algorithm 2 SAMPLE-THEN-RESPOND
Input: database D; randomised mechanism M∆ : B →
R; target mapping f : Dn → B, sample size m, order
statistic index k, distribution P
Set ∆ˆ to SENSITIVITYSAMPLER (|D|, f,m, k, P )
respond M∆ˆ(D)
P is chosen to match the desired distribution in definition
of random differential privacy. A number of natural choices
are available for P (cf. Remark 7). The main idea of
SENSITIVITYSAMPLER is that for each extended-database
observation of D ∼ Pn+1, we induce i.i.d. observations
G1, . . . , Gm ∈ R of the random variable
G = ‖f (D1...n)− f (D1...n−1;n+1)‖B .
From these observations of the sensitivity of target map-
ping f : Dn → B, we estimate w.h.p. sensitivity that
can achieve random differential privacy, for the full suite of
sensitivity-induced private mechanisms discussed above.
If we knew the full CDF of G, we would simply invert
this CDF to determine the level of sensitivity for achieving
any desired γ level of random differential privacy: higher
confidence would invoke higher sensitivity and therefore
lower utility. However as we cannot in general possess
the true CDF, we resort to uniformly approximating it
w.h.p. using the empirical CDF induced by the sample
G1, . . . , Gm. The guarantee of uniform approximation de-
rives from empirical process theory. Figure 1 provides
further intuition behind SENSITIVITYSAMPLER. Algo-
rithm 2 presents SAMPLE-THEN-RESPOND which com-
poses SENSITIVITYSAMPLER with any sensitivity-induced
differentially-private mechanism.
Our main result Theorem 15 presents explicit expressions
for parameters m, k that are sufficient to guarantee that
SAMPLE-THEN-RESPOND achieves (, δ, γ)-random dif-
ferential privacy. Under that result the parameter ρ, which
controls the uniform approximation of the empirical CDF
from G1, . . . , Gm sample to the true CDF, is introduced
Figure 1. Inside SENSITIVITYSAMPLER: the true sensitivity
CDF (blue); empirical sensitivity CDF (piecewise constant red);
inversion of the empirical CDF (black dotted); where ρ, ρ′ are the
DKW confidence and errors defined in Theorem 15.
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as a free parameter. We demonstrate through a series of
optimisations in Corollaries 20–21 how ρ can be tuned to
optimise either sampling effort m, utility via order statis-
tic index k, or privacy confidence γ. These alternative ex-
plicit choices for ρ serve as optimal operating points for the
mechanism.
5.1. Practicalities
SENSITIVITYSAMPLER simplifies the application of dif-
ferential privacy by obviating the challenge of bounding
sensitivity. As such, it is important to explore any practical
issues arising in its implementation. The algorithm itself
involves few main stages: sampling databases, measuring
sensitivity, sorting, order statistic lookup (inversion), fol-
lowed by the sensitivity-induced private mechanism.
Sampling. As discussed in Remark 7, a number of nat-
ural choices for sampling distribution P could be made.
Where a simulation process exists, capable of generating
synthetic data approximatingD, then this could be run. For
example in the Bayesian setting (Dimitrakakis et al., 2014),
one could use a public conditional likelihood p(·|θ), para-
metric family Θ, prior ξ(θ) and sample from the marginal∫
Θ
p(x|θ)dξ(θ). Alternatively, it may suffice to sample
from the uniform distribution on D, or Gaussian restricted
to EuclideanD. In any of these cases, sampling is relatively
straightforward and the choice should consider meaningful
random differential privacy guarantees relative to P .
Sensitivity Measurement. A trivial stage, given neigh-
bouring databases, measurement could involve expanding
a mathematical expression representing a target function,
or a computer program such as running a deep learning or
computer vision open-source package. For some targets,
it may be that running first on one database, covers much
of the computation required for the neighbouring database
in which case amortisation may improve runtime. The cost
of sensitivity measurement will be primarily determined by
sample size m. Note that sampling and measurement can
be trivially parallelised over map-reduce-like platforms.
Sorting, Inversion. Strictly speaking the entire sensitivity
sample need not be sorted, as only one order statistic is re-
quired. That said, sorting even millions of scalar measure-
ments can be accomplished in under a second on a stock
machine. An alternative strategy to inversion as presented,
is to take the maximum sensitivity measured so as to max-
imise privacy without consideration to utility.
Mechanism. It is noteworthy that in settings where mech-
anism M∆ is to be run multiple times, the estimation of ∆ˆ
need not be redone. As such SENSITIVITYSAMPLER could
be performed entirely in an offline amortisation stage.
6. Analysis
For the i.i.d. sample of sensitivities G1, . . . , Gm drawn
within Algorithm 1, denote the corresponding fixed un-
known CDF, and corresponding random empirical CDF, by
Φ (g) = Pr (G ≤ g) ,
Φm (g) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
1 [Gi ≤ g] .
In this section we use Φm (∆) to bound the likelihood of a
(non-private, possibly deterministic) mapping f : Dn → R
achieving sensitivity ∆. This permits bounding RDP.
Theorem 15. Consider any non-private mapping f :
Dn → B, any sensitivity-induced (, δ)-differentially pri-
vate mechanismM∆ mapping B to (randomised) responses
in R, any database D of n records, privacy parameters
 > 0, δ ∈ [0, 1], γ ∈ (0, 1), and sampling parameters size
m ∈ N, order statistic index m ≥ k ∈ N, approximation
confidence 0 < ρ < min{γ, 1/2}, distribution P on D. If
m ≥ 1
2(γ − ρ)2 log
(
1
ρ
)
, (1)
k ≥ m
(
1− γ + ρ+
√
log(1/ρ)/(2m)
)
, (2)
then Algorithm 2 run with D,M∆, f,m, k, P , preserves
(, δ, γ)-random differential privacy.
Proof. Consider any ρ′ ∈ (0, 1) to be determined later,
and consider sampling G1, . . . , Gm and sorting to G(1) ≤
. . . ≤ G(m). Provided that
1− γ + ρ+ ρ′ ≤ 1 ⇔ ρ′ ≤ γ − ρ , (3)
then the random sensitivity ∆ˆ = G(k), where k = dm(1−
γ + ρ + ρ′)e, is the smallest ∆ ≥ 0 such that Φm(∆) ≥
1− γ + ρ+ ρ′. That is,
Φm(∆ˆ) ≥ 1− γ + ρ+ ρ′ . (4)
Note that if 1− γ + ρ+ ρ′ < 0 then ∆ˆ can be taken as any
∆, namely zero. Define the events
A∆ = {∀R ⊂ R, Pr (M∆(f(D)) ∈ R) ≤ exp()·
Pr (M∆(f(D
′)) ∈ R) + δ}
Bρ′ =
{
sup
∆
(Φm(∆)− Φ(∆)) ≤ ρ′
}
.
The first is the event that DP holds for a specific DB pair,
when the mechanism is run with (possibly random) sensi-
tivity parameter ∆; the second records the empirical CDF
uniformly one-sided approximating the CDF to level ρ′. By
the sensitivity-induced -differential privacy of M∆,
∀∆ > 0 , PrD,D′∼Pn+1 (A∆) ≥ Φ(∆) . (5)
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Table 1. Optimal ρ operating points for budgeted resources—γ or m—minimising m, γ or k; proved in Appendix B.
Budgeted Optimise ρ γ m k
γ ∈ (0, 1) m exp
(
W−1
(
− γ
2
√
e
)
+ 12
)
•
⌈
log( 1ρ )
2(γ−ρ)2
⌉ ⌈
m
(
1− γ + ρ+
√
log( 1ρ )
2m
)⌉
m ∈ N, γ k exp ( 12W−1 (− 14m)) ≥ ρ+√ log( 1ρ )2m • ⌈m(1− γ + ρ+√ log( 1ρ )2m )⌉
m ∈ N γ exp ( 12W−1 (− 14m)) ρ+√ log( 1ρ )2m • m
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Figure 2. The minimum sample size m (sampler effort) required
to achieve various target RDP confidence levels γ.
The random D,D′ on the left-hand side induce the distri-
bution on G on the right-hand side under which Φ(∆) =
PrG (G ≤ ∆). The probability on the left is the level of
random differential privacy of M∆ when run on fixed ∆.
By the Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz inequality (Massart,
1990) we have that for all ρ′ ≥√(log 2)/(2m),
PrG1,...,Gm (Bρ′) ≥ 1− e−2mρ
′2
. (6)
Putting inequalities (4), (5), and (6) together, provided that
ρ′ ≥√(log 2)/(2m), yields that
PrD,D′,G1,...,Gm
(
A∆ˆ
)
=E
[
1
[
A∆ˆ
]∣∣Bρ′]Pr (Bρ′) + E [1 [A∆ˆ]∣∣Bρ′]Pr (Bρ′)
≥E
[
Φ
(
∆ˆ
)∣∣∣Bρ′]Pr (Bρ′)
≥E
[
Φm
(
∆ˆ
)
− ρ′
∣∣∣Bρ′] (1− exp (−2mρ′2))
≥ (1− γ + ρ+ ρ′ − ρ′) (1− exp (−2mρ′2))
≥(1− γ + ρ)(1− ρ)
≥1− γ + ρ− ρ
=1− γ .
The last inequality follows from ρ < γ; the penultimate
inequality follows from setting
ρ′ ≥
√
1
2m
log
(
1
ρ
)
, (7)
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Figure 3. For sample sizes m ∈ {102, 103, 104}, trade-offs be-
tween privacy confidence level γ and order-statistic index k (rel-
ative to m) which controls sensitivity estimates and so utility.
and so the DKW condition (Massart, 1990), that ρ′ ≥√
(log 2)/(2m), is met provided that ρ ≤ 1/2. Now (1)
follows from substituting (7) into (3).
Note that for sensitivity-induced -differentially private
mechanisms, the theorem applies with δ = 0.
Optimising Free Parameter ρ. Table 1 recommends alter-
native choices of free parameter ρ, derived by optimising
the sampler’s performance along one axis—privacy con-
fidence γ, sampler effort m, or order statistic index k—
given a fixed budget of another. The table summarises re-
sults with proofs found in Appendix B. The specific ex-
pressions derived involve branches of the Lambert-W func-
tion, which is the inverse relation of the function f(z) =
z exp(z), and is implemented as a special function in scien-
tific libraries as standard. While Lambert-W is in general
a multi-valued relation on the analytic complex domain, all
instances in our results are single-real-valued functions on
the reals. The next result presents the first operating point’s
corresponding rate on effort in terms of privacy, and fol-
lows from recent bounds on the secondary branchW−1 due
to Chatzigeorgiou (2013).2
Corollary 16. Minimising m for given γ (cf. Table 1,
row 1; Corollary 20, Appendix B), yields rate for m as
2That for all u > 0, −1 − √2u − u < W−1(−e−u−1) <
−1−√2u− 2
3
u.
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with increasing privacy confidence 1γ →∞.
Remark 17. Theorem 15 and Table 1 elucidate that effort,
privacy and utility are in tension. Effort is naturally de-
creased by reducing the confidence level of RDP (ρ chosen
to minimise m, or γ). By minimising order statistic index
k, we select smaller Gk and therefore sensitivity estimate
∆ˆ. This in turn leads to lower generic mechanism noise
and higher utility. All this is achieved by sacrificing effort
or privacy confidence. As usual, sacrificing  or δ privacy
levels also leads to utility improvement. Figures 2 and 3
visualise these operating points.
Less conservative estimates on sensitivity can lead to supe-
rior utility while also enjoying easier implementation. This
hypothesis is borne out in experiments in Section 7.
Proposition 18. For any f : Dn → B with global sen-
sitivity ∆ = supD∼D′ ‖f(D) − f(D′)‖B, SENSITIVI-
TYSAMPLER’s random sensitivity ∆ˆ ≤ ∆. As a result,
Algorithm 2 run with any of the sensitivity-induced private
mechanisms of Corollaries 10–14 achieves utility dominat-
ing that of the respective mechanisms run with ∆.
7. Experiments
We now demonstrate the practical value of SENSITIVI-
TYSAMPLER. First in Section 7.1 we illustrate how SEN-
SITIVITYSAMPLER sensitivity quickly approaches analyt-
ical high-probability sensitivity, and how it can be sig-
nificantly lower than worst-case global sensitivity in Sec-
tion 7.2. Running privatising mechanisms with lower sen-
sitivity parameters can mitigate utility loss, while maintain-
ing (a weaker form of) differential privacy. We present ex-
perimental evidence of this utility savings in Section 7.3.
While application domains may find the alternate balance
towards utility appealing by itself, it should be stressed
that a significant advantage of SENSITIVITYSAMPLER is
its ease of implementation.
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7.1. Analytical RDP vs. Sampled Sensitivity
Consider running Example 6: private release of sample
mean f(D) = n−1
∑n
i=1Di of a database D drawn i.i.d.
from Exp(1). Figure 4 presents, for varying probability
γ: the analytical bound on sensitivity versus SENSITIVI-
TYSAMPLER estimates for different sampling budgets av-
eraged over 50 repeats. For fixed sampling budget, ∆ˆ is
estimated at lower limits on γ, quickly converging to exact.
7.2. Global Sensitivity vs. Sampled Sensitivity
Consider now the challenging goal of privately releasing an
SVM classifier fit to sensitive training data. In applying the
Laplace mechanism to releasing the primal normal vector,
Rubinstein et al. (2012) bound the vector’s sensitivity using
algorithmic stability of the SVM. In particular, a lengthy
derivation establishes that ‖wD − wD′‖1 ≤ 4LCκ
√
d/n
for a statistically consistent formulation of the SVM with
convex L-Lipschitz loss, d-dimensional feature mapping
with supx k(x,x) ≤ κ2, and regularisation parameter C.
While the original work (and others since) did not consider
the practical problem of releasing unregularised bias term
b, we can effectively bound this sensitivity via a short argu-
ment in Appendix D.
Proposition 19. For the SVM run with hinge loss, linear
kernel, D = [0, 1]d, the release (w, b) has L1 global sensi-
tivity bounded by 2 + 2C
√
d+ 4Cd/n.
We train private SVM using the Laplace mechanism (Ru-
binstein et al., 2012), with global sensitivity bound of
Proposition 19 or SENSITIVITYSAMPLER. We synthe-
sise a dataset of n = 1000 points, selected with equal
probability of being drawn from the positive class N(0.2 ·
1,diag(0.01)) or negative class N(0.8 · 1,diag(0.01)).
The feature space’s dimension varies from d = 8 through
d = 64. The SVMs are run with C = 3, SENSITIVI-
TYSAMPLER with m = 1500 & varying γ. Figure 5 shows
very different sensitivities obtained. While estimated ∆ˆ
hovers around 0.01 largely independent of γ, global sen-
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sitivity ∆ exceeds 20—two orders of magnitude greater.
These patterns are repeated as dimension increases; sensi-
tivity increasing is to be expected since as dimensions are
added, the few points in the training set become more likely
to be support vectors and thus affecting sensitivity. Such
conservative estimates could clearly lead to inferior utility.
7.3. Effect on Utility
Support Vector Classification. We return to the same
SVM setup as in the previous section, with d = 2, now
plotting utility as misclassification error (averaged over 500
repeats) vs. privacy budget . Here we set γ = 0.05
and include also the non-private SVM’s performance as a
bound on utility possible. See Figure 6. At very high pri-
vacy levels both private SVMs suffer the same poor error.
But quickly with lower privacy, the misclassification error
of SENSITIVITYSAMPLER drops until it reaches the non-
private rate. Simultaneously the global sensitivity approach
has a significantly higher value and suffers a much slower
decline. These results suggest that SENSITIVITYSAMPLER
can achieve much better utility in addition to sensitivity.
Kernel Density Estimation. We finally consider a one di-
mensional (d = 1) KDE setting. In Figure 7 we show the
error (averaged over 1000 repeats) of the Bernstein mecha-
nism (with lattice size k = 10 and Bernstein order h = 3)
on 5000 points drawn from a mixture of two normal dis-
tributions N(0.5, 0.02) and N(0.75, 0.005) with weights
0.4, 0.6, respectively. For this experimental result, we set
m = 50000 and two different values for γ, as displayed
in Figure 7. Once again we observe that for high privacy
levels the global sensitivity approach incurs a higher error
relative to non-private, while SENSITIVITYSAMPLER pro-
vides stronger utility. At lower privacy, both approaches
converge to the approximation error of the Bernstein poly-
nomial used.
8. Conclusion
In this paper we propose SENSITIVITYSAMPLER, an al-
gorithm for empirical estimation of sensitivity for privati-
sation of black-box functions. Our work addresses an
important usability gap in differential privacy, whereby
several generic privatisation mechanisms exist complete
with privacy and utility guarantees, but require analyti-
cal bounds on global sensitivity (a Lipschitz condition)
on the non-private target. While this sensitivity is triv-
ially derived for simple statistics, for state-of-the-art learn-
ers sensitivity derivations are arduous e.g., in collabora-
tive filtering (McSherry & Mironov, 2009), SVMs (Ru-
binstein et al., 2012; Chaudhuri et al., 2011), model se-
lection (Thakurta & Smith, 2013), feature selection (Kifer
et al., 2012), Bayesian inference (Dimitrakakis et al., 2014;
Wang et al., 2015), and deep learning (Abadi et al., 2016).
While derivations may prevent domain experts from lever-
aging differential privacy, our SENSITIVITYSAMPLER
promises to make privatisation simple when using existing
mechanisms including Laplace (Dwork et al., 2006), Gaus-
sian (Dwork & Roth, 2014), exponential (McSherry & Tal-
war, 2007) and Bernstein (Alda` & Rubinstein, 2017). All
such mechanisms guarantee differential privacy on pairs of
databases for which a level ∆ of non-private function sen-
sitivity holds, when the mechanism is run with that ∆ pa-
rameter. For all such mechanisms we leverage results from
empirical process theory to establish guarantees of random
differential privacy (Hall et al., 2012) when using sampled
sensitivities only.
Experiments demonstrate that real-world learners can eas-
ily be run privately without any new derivation whatso-
ever. And by using a naturally-weaker form of privacy,
while replacing worst-case global sensitivity bounds with
estimated (actual) sensitivities, we can achieve far superior
utility than existing approaches.
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A. Proof of Proposition 8
By Pinsker’s inequality the product measures have bounded
total variation distance∥∥Pn+1 −Qn+1∥∥ ≤√1
2
KL (Pn+1‖Qn+1) ≤
√
n+ 1
2
τ .
Denote by A the event that -DP holds (similarly for (, δ)-
DP) on neighbouring databases on n records:
A = {∀R ⊂ R,Pr (M(D) ∈ R) ≤ ePr (M(D′) ∈ R)} .
Then RDP wrt Q follows as
Qn+1(A) ≥ Pn+1(A)−
√
(n+ 1)τ/2
≥ 1− γ −
√
(n+ 1)τ/2 .
B. Optimising Sampler Performance with ρ
This section presents precise statements and proofs for the
expressions found in Table 1.
B.1. Fixed γ Minimumm
Corollary 20. For fixed given privacy confidence budget
γ ∈ (0, 1), taking
ρ = exp
(
W−1
(
− γ
2
√
e
)
+
1
2
)
,
m =
⌈(
2(γ − ρ)2)−1 log(1/ρ)⌉ ,
k =
⌈
m
(
1− γ + ρ+
√
log(1/ρ)/(2m)
)⌉
,
minimises sampling effort m, when running Algorithm 2
to achieve (, δ, γ)-RDP.
Proof. For any fixed γ ∈ (0, 1), our task is to minimise the
bound
m(ρ) =
1
2(γ − ρ)2 log
1
ρ
,
on ρ ∈ (0,min{γ, 0.5}). The first- and second-order
derivatives of this function are
∂m
∂ρ
= − log ρ
(γ − ρ)3 −
1
2ρ(γ − ρ)2
∂2m
∂ρ2
= − 3 log ρ
(γ − ρ)4 −
2
ρ(γ − ρ)3 +
1
2ρ2(γ − ρ)2
=
1
2ρ2(γ − ρ)4
[
(γ − 3ρ)2 + ρ2
(
6 log
1
ρ
− 4
)]
.
For the second derivative to be positive, it is sufficient for
6 log 1ρ − 4 > 0 which in turn is guaranteed when ρ <
exp(−2/3) ≈ 0.51. Therefore m(ρ) is strictly convex on
the feasible region; and the first-order necessary condition
for optimality is also sufficient. We seek ρ? critical point
0 = −(γ − ρ?)−2
[
log ρ?
γ − ρ? +
1
2ρ?
]
⇔ − log ρ
?
γ − ρ? =
1
2ρ?
⇔ −γ = 2ρ? log ρ? − ρ?
⇔ − γ
2
√
e
=
(
log ρ? − 1
2
)
ρ?√
e
=
(
log ρ? − 1
2
)
exp
(
log ρ? − 1
2
)
Applying the Lambert-W function to each side, yields
log(ρ?)− 1
2
∈ W
(
− γ
2
√
e
)
⇔ ρ? ∈ exp
(
W
(
− γ
2
√
e
)
+
1
2
)
.
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Figure 8. The branches of the Lambert-W function: primary W0
(blue) and secondary W−1 (red).
The Lambert-W function is real-valued on
[− exp(−1),∞), within which it is two-valued on
(− exp(−1), 0) and univalued otherwise. As depicted
in Figure 8, it consists of a primary branch W0 which
maps [− exp(−1),∞) to [−1,∞), and a secondary
branch W−1 which maps [− exp(−1), 0) to [−1,−∞).
Returning to our condition on ρ?, consider that for
γ ∈ (0, 1) we have that − γ
2
√
e
since 2 >
√
e. On
this domain primary W0 ∈ (−1, 0) while secondary
W−1 ∈ (−∞,−1) and so the primary branch would yield
ρ? ∈ (− exp(−0.5), exp(0.5)) which is disjoint from
feasible region (0, 0.5]. The secondary branch, however,
has image in (0, 0.28457 . . .) which is feasible. Therefore,
we arrive at the ρ? as claimed, completing the main part of
the proof.
B.2. Fixedm and γ Minimum k
Corollary 21. For given fixed sampling resource budget
m ∈ N and privacy confidence γ ∈ (0, 1), taking
ρ = exp
(
1
2
W−1
(
− 1
4m
))
,
k =
⌈
m
(
1− γ + ρ+
√
log(1/ρ)/(2m)
)⌉
,
provided that
γ ≥ ρ+
√
log(1/ρ)/(2m) ,
minimises order-statistic index k, when running Algo-
rithm 2 to achieve (, δ, γ)-RDP.
Proof. For fixed m, γ, our task is to minimise the bound
k(ρ) = m
(
1− γ + ρ+
√
log(1/ρ)
2m
)
,
or equivalently
k˜(ρ) = ρ+
√
log(1/ρ)
2m
, (8)
on ρ ∈ (0,min{γ, 0.5}). The first- and second-order
derivatives of this function are
∂k˜
∂ρ
= 1− 1
2
√
2mρ
√
log(1/ρ)
∂2k˜
∂ρ2
=
1
2
√
2mρ2
√
log(1/ρ)
[
1− 1
2 log(1/ρ)
]
.
Since its leading term is positive on feasible ρ, it fol-
lows that the second derivative is strictly positive iff ρ <
exp(−1/2) ≈ 0.6 which is guaranteed on the feasible re-
gion. Therefore k(ρ) is strictly convex; and the first-order
necessary condition for optimality is also sufficient. Next
we seek ρ? critical point
0 = 1− 1
2
√
2mρ?
√
log(1/ρ?)
⇔ ρ?2 log ρ? = − 1
8m
⇔ ρ?2 log ρ?2 = − 1
4m
⇔ log ρ?2 = W
(
− 1
4m
)
⇔ ρ? ∈ exp
(
1
2
W
(
− 1
4m
))
,
where the introduction of the Lambert-W function lever-
ages the identity W (z log z) = log z. Since − exp(−1) <
−(4m)−1 < 0 it follows that W is real- and strictly nega-
tive in value. Further, since ρ ≤ 0.5 < exp(−1/2) ≈ 0.6,
it follows that our solution lies again in the lower branch as
claimed.
To guarantee that the relation (1) between m, γ, ρ is still
satisfied, we can solve the bound on m in terms of γ:
m ≥ 1
2(γ − ρ)2 log
(
1
ρ
)
⇔ γ ≥ ρ+
√
1
2m
log
(
1
ρ
)
. (9)
Operating with this γ establishes all the conditions of The-
orem 15.
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Figure 9. Global vs estimated sensitivity for the sample mean on
bounded data.
B.3. FixedmMinimum γ
Corollary 22. For given fixed sampling resource budget
m ∈ N, taking
ρ = exp
(
1
2
W−1
(
− 1
4m
))
,
γ = ρ+
√
log(1/ρ)/(2m) ,
k = m ,
minimises privacy confidence parameter γ, when running
Algorithm 2 to achieve (, δ, γ)-RDP.
Proof. Consider now choosing ρ to minimise γ, for given
fixed m sample size budget, while then taking order statis-
tic index k according to the selected m, ρ, γ. This cor-
responds to optimising the expression (9) with respect
to ρ. Noting that this expression is identical to the ob-
jective (8), again the global optimiser must be ρ? =
exp(W−1(−1/(4m))/2). With this choice of γ, the nec-
essary k equates to m.
C. Global vs. Sampled Sensitivity: Sample
Mean of Bounded Data
Consider the goal of releasing the sample mean f(D) =
n−1
∑n
i=1Di of a database D as in Example 6, but over
domain D = [0, 1]d. Figure 9 presents: the (sharp)
bound on global sensitivity for this target for use in e.g.,
the Laplace mechanism; and the sensitivity ∆ˆ estimated
by SENSITIVITYSAMPLER. Here D comprises n = 500
points sampled from the uniform distribution over D, with
SENSITIVITYSAMPLER run with optimised m under vary-
ing γ as displayed. The reduction in sensitivity due to
sampling is striking (note the log scale). This experiment
demonstrates sensitivity for different privacy guarantees
(DP vs. RDP). By contrast for the same level of privacy
(RDP) in Section 7.1, SENSITIVITYSAMPLER quickly ap-
proaches the analytical approach.
D. Proof of Proposition 19
It follows immediately that L = 1 and κ =
√
d. From the
solution b = yi −
∑n
j=1 αjyjk(Di, Dj) for some i ∈ [n],
combined with the box constraints 0 ≤ αj ≤ C/n, the
sensitivity of the bias can be bounded as 2 + 2C
√
d. Com-
bining with the existing normal vector sensitivity yields the
result.
